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RECENT DECISIONS
Agency - Agent as the Procuring Cause of the Sale - Plaintiff
entered into an oral agreement with the defendant that plaintiff would
"use his time, efforts and business contacts in an effort to procure for
defendant, orders and manufacturing contracts from C. Company" and
that defendant would pay to plaintiff "over and above his regular salary
a commission of five per cent of the net sales made by defendant to
said compan(ies) on orders or contracts obtained by defendant from
said compan(ies)." The evidence showed that plaintiff spent time and
effort in working on modifications of defendant's product to suit the
needs of C. Company, and that he introduced defendant to representa-
tives of C. Company with whom defendant successfully contracted for
the sale of its product. Plaintiff sued for his commission. Held: the evi-
dence was sufficient to sustain a finding that plaintiff was the procuring
cause of the sale and therefore entitled to his commission. Chamberlain
v. Abeles, 198 P. (2d) 927 (California 1948).
The agent's right to his commission depends entirely on the agree-
ment between the parties, and the agent must fulfill all of the require-
ments imposed by the principal to be entitled to this commission.' An
agent for the sale of property on commission must be the procuring
cause of the sale to be entitled to his commission.2 "Procuring cause"
means a cause setting in motion a series of events which without break
in their continuity result in achieving the prime objective of the employ-
ment of the agent.3 The agent who is the procuring cause of a sale is
to receive his commission though he is personally not present when
negotiations are concluded 4 and though he is not the sole cause of the
sale.5 In Session v. Pacific Improvement Co.6 the court stated "He who
shakes the tree is the one to gather the fruit." Whether or not the
agent is the procuring cause of a particular sale is a question of fact
and such finding is ordinarily conclusive."
Controversies over whether or not an agent has earned his com-
mission arise generally in real estate agency contracts and many states
now require such contracts to be in writing s Contracts with real estate
agents are either exclusive or non exclusive. Under the latter the agent
to be able to secure his commission must prove that he was the pro-
curing cause of the sale. It is generally held that the owner may list
13 C.J.S. 178.
2 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 448, comment (a).
3 Roth v. Thomson, 40 Cal. App. 208, 180 Pac. 656 (1919).
4 Hodges v. Ramsey, 216 S.W. 62 (Mo. App. 1919).5Henning v. Holbrook Blackwelder R. E. Trust Co., 218 Mo. App. 433, 277
S.W. 62 (1925).657 Cal. App. 1, 206 Pac. 653 (1922).7james v. Foster, 116 Cal. App. 162, 2 P(2d) 582 (1936).
8 See annotation in 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 933.
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his property with several agents under non exclusive contracts and
compensate the agent who produces or procures the purchaser. This
applies to cases where another agent first offered the property to the
purchaser, the owner being ignorant of the offer having been made.9
A fruitless attempt at sale on the part of the owner followed by a sale
to the purchaser procured by the agent will also entitle the agent to
his commission."0
Exclusive real estate agency contracts are either contracts giving
an exclusive "agency" to sell or those giving an exclusive "right" to
sell real property."" Where the agent is given an exclusive "agency"
to sell real property for a fixed period of time, he is entitled to his
commission regardless of whether the sale within the time stipulated
was procured by himself or another agent.' 2 The agent under such a
contract need only prove a bona fide attempt to procure a purchaser. 13
The placing of a "For Sale" sign14 or the mere listing of property
without further efforts to sell are not bona fide attempts to procure a
purchaser. 15
Generally, the giving of an exclusive "agency" to sell precludes sale
through another real estate agent only and does not preclude the
owner himself from selling without liability.16 The courts, however, are
in conflict on the effect to be given a sale by the owner of real property
where an exclusive right to sell has been given to the agent. Many
hold that such a contract will be strictly construed and precludes the
owner from himself selling the property as well as precluding sale
through another agent.'7 In Wisconsin by legislative enactment con-
tracts for commission on the sale of realty by an agent must also be
in writing. 8 The Wisconsin Court in the case of Bowe v. Gage9 in
construing a non exclusive contract for the sale of real estate repudi-
ated the rule cited with approval in an earlier case20 that where the
agent is the procuring cause of a sale, the law leans toward such con-
struction as will best secure to the agent his commission. In Roberts v.
9 Terry v. Bartlett, 153 Wis. 208, 140 N.W. 1133 (1913).20 Burdon v. Briqulent, 125 Wis. 341, 104 N.W. 83 (1905).
11 ,,... A distinction has been made between an exclusive agency and an ex-
clusive right to sell, the owner having a right to sell where the broker is
merely given the exclusive agency, but not where he is given the exclusive
right to sell ... ." Annotations in 20 A.L.R. 1270.
12Balser v. Ramseur, 209 Ark. 150, 189 S.W.(2d) 785 (1945).
13 Genske v. Christensen, 189 Wis. 520, 208 N.W. 467 (1926).
14 Huchting v. Rahn, 179 Wis. 50, 190 N.W. 847 (1922).
15 Starszek v. Kochanik, 199 Wis. 473, 222 N.W. 21 (1929).
16 Greene v. American Malting Co., 155 Wis. 216, 140 N.W. 1130 (1913).
1' Falkenberg v. Giacomazzi, 53 Cal. App. 449, 200 Pac. 372 (1921).
18 WIS. STAT. 240.10 (1947).
'19127 Wis. 245, 106 N.W. 1074 (1906). Contra: Duncan v. Borden, 13 Colo.
App. 480, 59 Pac. 60 (1899).




Harrington2' the owner gave the agent the "exclusive sale" of his farm
for four months but the contract did not specifically preclude the
owner himself from selling. The Wisconsin Court held that under such
circumstances the owner himself could sell without liability where he
had no knowledge of the prior negotiations carried on by the agent. In
that case the agent had given no consideration and the Court refused
to construe the contract as one limiting the owner's right to sell. The
agent was free to act or not act under the circumstances and the Court
reasoned that it would be inconsistent with the idea of ownership to
preclude the owner himself from selling without liability unless clear
and unequivocal language to that effect was used. In the subsequent
case of Greene v. Minnesota Billiard Co. 22 the agent was given an ex-
clusive right to sell but the contract contained the stipulation that the
agent was to receive his commission "regardless of who negotiates the
sale." The owner sold the property and it was shown that the agent had
spent time and money in efforts to procure a purchaser, and the Court
held that the agent was entitled to his commission.
The Wisconsin Court's interpretation of contracts giving an exclu-
sive right to sell does not place an unreasonable burden on the agent
by forcing him tb expressly stipulate that a sale by the owner shall not
deprive him of his commission. In the absence of either type of exclu-
sive contract the requirement that the agent prove that he was the pro-
curing cause of the sale is the only reasonable method of determining
whether the agent is to receive his commission.
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Evidence-John Doe and Grand Jury Proceedings -Plaintiff, in
his capacity as town chairman of the town of Lake, was arrested on the
charge of accepting a bribe. After the arrest, a magistrate in another
proceeding subpoenaed witnesses and conducted a John Doe hearing
into the matter. Plaintiff prayed for a writ of prohibition to restrain
the magistrate from further investigational hearings in the John Doe
proceeding. Held: writ denied. The Court stated that a writ of pro-
hibition is only issued to correct some grave abuse of power or when
the magistrate abuses his discretion, and will not issue in the absence
of a showing that the magistrate proceeded beyond his powers and
jurisdiction. State ex rel. Kowaleski v. District of Milwaukee County
et al., 254 Wis. 363, 36 N.W. (2d) 419 (1949).
This action involved a John Doe proceeding, rather than a Grand
Jury hearing, so that for clarity it becomes necessary to distinguish
between the two. A John Doe proceeding is a hearing conducted by a
21168 Wis. 217, 169 N.W. 603 (1918).
22 170 Wis. 597, 176 N.W. 239 (1920).
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